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Abstract
This paper estimates the potential distributional consequences of the first phase 
of the COVID-19 lockdowns on poverty and labour income inequality in 20 Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. We estimate the share of individuals that 
are potentially able to remain active under the lockdown by taking into account indi-
viduals’ teleworking capacity but also whether their occupation is affected by legal 
workplace closures or mobility restrictions. Furthermore, we compare the shares 
under the formal (de jure) lockdown policies assuming perfect compliance with the 
shares under de facto lockdowns where there is some degree of non-compliance. 
We then estimate individuals’ potential labour income losses and examine changes 
in poverty and labour income inequality. We find an increase in poverty and labour 
income inequality in most of the LAC countries due to social distancing; however, 
the observed changes are lower under de facto lockdowns, revealing the potential 
role of non-compliance as a coping strategy during the lockdowns. Social distanc-
ing measures have led to an increase in inequality both between and within coun-
tries. Lastly, we show that most of the dispersion in the labour income loss across 
countries is explained by the sectoral/occupational employment structure of the 
economies.
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1 Introduction
To prevent the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the world 
have imposed social distancing measures which have had an asymmetric effect on 
the labour market. While some sectors have been considered essential and thus 
essential workers have continued to go to work and to receive their wages, other sec-
tors have had to close or have been affected by mobility restrictions because of the 
high risk of transmission of the virus that these activities entail. Among the individ-
uals that have been asked to stay at home, some have been able to remain active due 
to the task content of their occupations (Dingel and Neiman 2020; Delaporte and 
Peña 2020; Gottlieb et al. 2021; Hatayama et al. 2020; Barbieri et al. 2020; Béland 
et al. 2020; Hensvik et al. 2020; Holgersen et al. 2020; Yasenov 2020), while others 
have not been able to work from home and have experienced wage losses. Therefore, 
the effect of social distancing policies could be significant in terms of labour income 
inequality and poverty rates.
A rapidly growing literature analyses the distributional effects of the lockdown 
policies on poverty and inequality (Palomino et al. 2020; Perugini and Vladisavljevic 
2020; Brunori et al. 2020; Bonacini et al. 2021b; Duman 2020; Bonavida Foschiatti 
and Gasparini 2020; Lustig et al. 2020; Leone 2020; Botha et al. 2021).1 Among the 
existing studies, our paper is closely related to Palomino et  al. (2020) and Duman 
(2020). Palomino et al. (2020) evaluate the capacity of individuals in Europe to work 
under a lockdown based on a Lockdown Working Ability index that considers indi-
viduals’ teleworking capacity and whether their occupation is essential or closed. The 
authors rely on microsimulation techniques to examine the changes in poverty and 
inequality under different lockdown intensity and duration. They find an increase in 
both poverty and inequality in all European countries. Duman (2020) follows a simi-
lar methodology to examine the case of Turkey and finds that the overall negative 
distributional effects of the lockdown become more substantial with duration.
We contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, this paper 
evaluates the potential distributional consequences of social distancing on poverty 
and labour income inequality in 20 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. 
To do so, this study relies on two data sources. First, we gather detailed informa-
tion from national laws, decrees and press releases on the strictness and the dura-
tion of the first phase of the lockdown in each LAC country.2 The strictness of the 
lockdown measures is defined in terms of both workplace closures and mobility 
1 More generally, other studies analyse the socioeconomic and health impacts of the COVID-19 pan-
demic (Adams-Prassl et al. 2020; Depalo 2021; Bonacini, Gallo and Patriarca 2021a; Alon et al. 2020; 
Baert et al. 2020; Milani 2021).
2 This constitutes a novel compilation for the LAC region. Indeed, the laws, decrees and press releases 
contain detailed information on (i) economic activities that are considered essential/open, (ii) activities 
that must cease to operate, and (iii) activities for which mobility restrictions should apply. Furthermore, 
the laws and decrees provide a duration for these measures. The start date is the date at which the country 
started being under a national lockdown. The end date was less clear because each country implemented 
different progressive reopening plans. Nevertheless, we can approximate the end date of the first phase 
of the lockdown based on the date at which there was considerable reopening of industry and/or services 
under certain conditions. Information on the lockdown policies implemented in LAC countries is not 
reported in this paper but is available in Appendix C of the GLO discussion paper (GLO DP 682 [pre]).
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restrictions. Furthermore, when countries have adopted a regional approach for the 
lockdowns, we identify the measures at the regional level in order to capture the het-
erogeneity in the lockdown intensity and duration across regions within countries. 
Second, we use rich household surveys harmonised by the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (IADB). The surveys used for this study cover 20 countries, including 
one North American country, ten South American countries, five Central American 
countries and four Caribbean countries.3 The surveys contain harmonised individ-
ual-level data on demographic, labour and income conditions. More specifically, we 
have information on workers’ occupations, economic activities and labour income.
Second, this paper conducts a novel ex-post assessment of the potential implica-
tions of the COVID-19 lockdowns on poverty and inequality, thus departing from 
the strategy of simulating ex-ante impacts under different scenarios of lockdown. 
To carry out the analysis, we partly follow Palomino et  al. (2020) and Duman 
(2020) and construct the Lockdown Working Ability (LWA) index that represents 
the capacity of individuals to remain active under the first phase of the lockdown 
given their teleworkability index, i.e. the feasibility to work from home, but also 
whether their economic activity/occupation is affected by legal workplace closures 
or mobility restrictions. In particular, we assume that individuals who work in open 
sectors remain active while those who work in closed sectors do not. The remaining 
activities, which are neither open nor closed, are affected by mobility restrictions. 
As a result, the workers in these sectors are considered as active depending on their 
capacity to perform their job from home. However, we depart from existing stud-
ies on the following aspects. First, our LWA measure is based on a country-specific 
lockdown policy. In particular, the classification of sectors as essential or closed 
is unique to each country. Furthermore, when countries have adopted a regional 
approach, we classify the sectors as essential or closed according to the measures 
implemented in each region.4 Similarly, the duration of the first phase of the lock-
down varies across countries and regions.5
Third, this paper contributes to the existing literature by comparing the formal 
(de jure) lockdown policies when perfect compliance is assumed with de facto lock-
downs when there is some degree of non-compliance. The difference is likely to be 
important in the context of LAC countries for several reasons (Yeyati and Sartorio 
2020a; Yeyati and Valdés 2020). First, the region is characterised by a high rate of 
informality. Besides, a large share of the population lives in poverty and in over-
crowded habitats. Furthermore, governments’ income support programmes are often 
limited (Busso et al. 2020). As a result, people’s capability and willingness to com-
ply with restrictive policies is likely to differ across places and over time (Galasso 
et al. 2020; Yeyati and Sartorio 2020a). In addition, non-compliance is relevant from 
3 The list of countries is as follows: Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
4 This is the case for Brazil for which we identify the measures at the state level.
5 For some countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, lockdown duration also varies across regions. 
We use the term “region” to refer to provinces for Argentina, to states for Brazil and to communes for 
Chile.
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an economic point of view as it allows us to uncover the role of a potential coping 
strategy that has received little attention. Indeed, non-compliance can be a mecha-
nism to smooth labour income losses related to lockdowns. To take this into consid-
eration, we modify the LWA measure to allow for some degree of non-compliance. 
More specifically, we assume that, for closed and restricted activities, the proportion 
of individuals that remain active depends additionally on the level of non-compli-
ance at the regional level in each country. To estimate the degree of non-compliance, 
we follow Yeyati and Sartorio (2020a) and use the Oxford Stringency Index (OSI), 
which constitutes a continuous measure of the intensity of the formal lockdown pol-
icies over time, as well as Google workplace mobility data to proxy for de facto 
lockdowns. By normalizing and taking the difference between the two measures, we 
obtain a proxy of compliance over time at the regional level in each country.
Once individuals that are able to work have been identified, the next step is to cal-
culate individuals’ potential labour income losses due to social distancing given that 
the duration of the first phase of the lockdown varies across countries. We examine 
how the mean loss labour income rate varies across occupations, economic activi-
ties and specific population groups within countries. Furthermore, we compare the 
mean loss labour income rate under de jure and de facto lockdowns. Then, by com-
paring the pre-lockdown situation with the situation at the end of the initial phase 
of the lockdown, we measure the changes in poverty and labour income inequality 
across countries. We follow Palomino et  al. (2020) and use a series of measures 
to illustrate these changes. First, for our analysis on poverty, we compute for each 
country the Lockdown Incidence Curve (LIC), which represents the relative change 
in the labour income of individuals ordered by percentiles. In addition, we compute 
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indices to estimate changes in the share of workers liv-
ing with a labour income below the international poverty line as well as changes 
in the median poverty gap and in the severity of poverty.6 Second, to calculate the 
changes in labour income inequality, we use the Gini coefficient and the Mean Log-
arithmic Deviation (MLD) index. While the first measure is traditionally used to 
study inequality, the second measure allows us to decompose overall inequality into 
a between-group and a within-group component (Bourguignon 1979). We compute 
all the measures under perfect and imperfect compliance.
Our results show considerable variation across countries in the share of individu-
als potentially able to remain active under the first phase of the lockdown. This share 
also varies significantly within countries across occupations, economic activities 
and specific population groups. Our results on the potential labour income losses 
show different effects across countries. For instance, in Argentina, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, the bottom 
percentiles are the most affected. By contrast, in Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Jamaica, Paraguay and Uruguay, all parts of the labour income distribution suffer 
relatively similar losses. Across occupations, craft and related trades workers suf-
fer the largest losses. Across economic activities, workers in the construction sec-
tor experience significant labour income losses as well. Further analysis suggests 
6 We consider workers as living in poverty if they have a labour income below the international poverty 
line of $5 (2011 PPP), which was already included in the household surveys.
1 3
The distributional consequences of social distancing on poverty…
that the potential losses do not differ significantly by gender and level of education. 
However, informal workers have higher potential labour income losses than formal 
workers. Finally, introducing non-compliance attenuates the labour income losses 
across the income distribution.
Concerning our analysis on poverty and inequality, we find an increase in the 
share of workers living in poverty in almost all countries. Under perfect compli-
ance, the highest increase in the headcount poverty index is observed in Guatemala. 
We also find that labour income inequality increases for the Gini coefficient and the 
MLD in almost all countries. The largest increase in the Gini coefficient is observed 
in El Salvador, while the largest increase in the MLD index is in Brazil when assum-
ing perfect compliance. Overall, the observed changes in poverty and inequality are 
lower under de facto compliance, highlighting the potential role of non-compliance 
in LAC countries as a coping strategy during the lockdowns.7 Lastly, we decompose 
overall inequality for the LAC region into a between-countries and a within-coun-
tries component and find that social distancing has led to an increase in inequality 
both between and within countries. These changes are reduced in magnitude under 
imperfect compliance, but the pattern remains the same: between-country inequality 
increases significantly more than within-country inequality.
There are several potential explanations for these observed changes in poverty 
and labour income inequality. The increases are in general larger in countries that 
have implemented stricter and longer lockdowns but also in countries that are char-
acterised by a higher share of jobs that cannot be performed from home. To bet-
ter understand differences across countries, we conduct a series of counterfactual 
exercises to disentangle two reasons for the dispersion in the labour income loss 
across countries, namely the stringency of the lockdown policy and, conditional 
on implementing a lockdown, the sectoral/occupational employment structure of 
the economy. More specifically, we borrow from Caselli (2005) the inter-percen-
tile differential measure and compute it after applying to all countries a common 
lockdown policy.8 The results of these simulations show that on average 75% of the 
cross-country labour income loss dispersion in the LAC region is explained by the 
sectoral/occupational employment structure of the economies. This result highlights 
the importance of considering the sectoral/occupational employment structure of the 
economy when implementing lockdowns, as this is a key factor in determining the 
magnitude and dispersion of potential labour income losses.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the data and esti-
mate teleworking capacity before explaining how the LWA index is constructed. In 
Sect. 3, we explain the methodology applied to calculate the changes in poverty and 
7 It is important to note that, in this analysis, we do not examine the health risks and related economic 
costs that non-compliers are facing, neither do we discuss the ethical issue that poses non-compliance. 
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that imperfect compliance has negative consequences on public health 
and poses important economic risks for societies. However, since our analysis is framed in a partial equi-
librium setting and only examines the consequences of social distancing measures on labour income pov-
erty and inequality, we find that non-compliance, by allowing a larger proportion of individuals to remain 
active, acts as a mechanism through which individuals smooth labour income losses.
8 Caselli (2005) uses this measure in an analysis of cross-country income differences.
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labour income inequality and present the results for the distributional effects of de 
jure and de facto lockdowns in LAC countries. Lastly, Sect. 4 concludes.
2  The capacity to work under COVID‑19
In this section, we first present the individual-level data that is used for the analysis. 
We then estimate the feasibility to work from home before presenting the Lockdown 
Working Ability (LWA) index which captures individuals’ ability to work during the 
lockdown. We propose two measures of the LWA index: the first measure assumes 
perfect lockdown compliance and takes into account individuals’ teleworking capac-
ity but also whether individuals’ occupation is affected by workplace closures and 
mobility restrictions, while the second measure allows additionally for some degree 
of non-compliance.
2.1  Individual‑level data
This study uses rich household surveys from the IADB covering 20 LAC countries: 
Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. For each country, we use the 
most recent harmonised survey that is available.9 Table 3 in the Appendix provides 
the name of the survey, the year and the number of individuals in the sample for each 
country. The surveys contain harmonised individual-level data on demographic, 
educational, labour, income and housing conditions. More specifically, we have 
information on workers’ occupations, economic activity and annual labour income.
It should be noted that the information collected for Argentina and the Baha-
mas is only representative of the urban areas. Therefore, the results for these two 
countries are not directly comparable to the ones for the other countries. Indeed, 
the feasibility to work from home is usually higher in urban compared to rural areas 
(Delaporte and Peña 2020). In the opposite, the share of individuals able to remain 
active under the lockdown is expected to be lower in urban areas. This is due to the 
fact that the virus is more easily spread in urban areas due to population density and 
as a result the lockdown measures are stricter in urban compared to rural areas.10
10 In general, we expect to see some heterogeneity in the stringency of the lockdown policies applied 
in LAC countries, since countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have not been affected by the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the same proportion. According to the IADB, by the end of the year 2020, the 
countries that have the highest number of confirmed deaths per millions of inhabitants are Peru (1,108), 
Argentina (902) and Mexico (884) (IADB 2020). However, these numbers have to be taken with caution. 
Indeed, due to low testing, the actual extent of COVID-19 infections is highly uncertain. It is likely to be 
much higher in the LAC region than recorded numbers suggest.
9 We use data from 2019 (for some countries, earlier) in order to examine a crisis that happened in 2020. 
We acknowledge that using the economic structure of previous years as a baseline to measure the poten-
tial impacts of social distancing on poverty and inequality is a limitation in itself; however, in the context 
of an ongoing debate, this is one of the most reasonable approaches to understand the potential impacts 
of the current crisis.
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2.2  The teleworkability index
A rapidly growing literature since the beginning of the pandemic has been focusing 
on estimating the feasibility to work from home for individuals across the world. 
The existing studies differ in their approach. The first study by Dingel and Neiman 
(2020) uses information about the task content of occupations in the US to estimate 
the share of jobs that can potentially be done from home. The authors use surveys 
from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). Others have adopted the 
same approach and have relied on the O*NET data to estimate the capacity to work 
from home in varied national contexts (Mongey and Weinberg 2020; Béland et al. 
2020; Yasenov 2020; Duman 2020; Gallacher and Hossain 2020). However, it has 
been argued that the task content of occupations may vary significantly across con-
texts and that US-based measures might not be the most representative for develop-
ing economies.
To address this concern, Gottlieb et  al. (2021) rely on the World Bank’s Skills 
Toward Employability and Productivity (STEP) surveys which provide information 
about the task content of occupations in 10 developing economies. They find a lower 
share of jobs that can be performed at home in these 10 developing economies com-
pared to when O*NET is used. Similarly, Hatayama et al. (2020) rely on the Surveys 
of Adult Skills of PIAAC, the STEP surveys and the Labor Market Panel Surveys 
(LMPS) to calculate the feasibility of working from home in 53 countries. Other 
studies focus on specific countries and have used a country-specific task content of 
occupations to calculate the share of teleworkability (Barbieri et al. 2020; Bonacini 
et al. 2021b; Holgersen et al. 2020). More recently, a few studies have been able to 
rely on data collected during the pandemic and have provided real-time measures of 
the capacity for individuals to work from home (Brynjolfsson et al. 2020; Hensvik 
et al. 2020; Leone 2020).
With respect to Latin American and Caribbean countries, since information on 
the task content of occupations is not available specifically for each country of our 
sample, we adopt the following approach. We construct our measure of teleworkabil-
ity capturing the feasibility for each occupation to be performed from home by using 
information about the task content of occupations from the STEP surveys. More 
specifically, there are two LAC countries sampled in the STEP surveys: Bolivia and 
Colombia. Since the task content of occupations in these two countries is likely to 
be more representative of the task content of occupations in other LAC countries11 
than if we were to use US-based measures, we use the information provided by these 
two countries for the 20 countries included in our sample. It should be noted that the 
STEP surveys are restricted in their geographical scope to urban areas only and were 
collected in 2012. Regarding the geographical coverage of the surveys, this might 
11 If we classify occupations according to their task content into abstract, manual and routine occupa-
tions following the classification proposed by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and Autor and Dorn 
(2013) and if we compare the corresponding employment shares that we obtain, the average shares for 
Bolivia and Colombia are close to the LAC average shares. If we take these employment shares as an 
indication that there are similarities in task content across countries in the LAC region, then this similar-
ity would also be expressed in the teleworkability share, which is just another sphere of the task content 
of occupations.
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lead to an overestimation of the proportion of individuals able to work from home. 
However, it is important to note that the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the 
process of technological change, which in turn might have increased the telework-
ability share of the LAC economies. Regarding the fact that the information was 
collected in 2012, it would constitute an issue only if the task content of occupations 
has changed dramatically over the last decade.
Following the methodology of Gottlieb et  al. (2021), we classify workers as 
unable to work from home if they either do not use a computer at work, lift heavy 
objects, repair electronic equipment, operate heavy machinery or report that cus-
tomer interaction is very important. Once workers have been classified accordingly, 
we can obtain the share of individuals that can work from home by country and 
occupation. We take the average of the share of individuals that are able to work 
from home in Bolivia and Colombia at the 2-digit ISCO level. We can then merge 
the average share obtained for all 2-digit ISCOs from Bolivia and Colombia using 
our own 2-digit ISCO variable in our individual-level data. In this respect, we con-
struct a harmonised version of the 2-digit ISCO-08 categories, which was not avail-
able in the IADB surveys.12 We do so to gain in precision. Indeed, there is a lot of 
heterogeneity in the task content of the occupations within the 1-digit occupational 
categories. Therefore, estimating the teleworkability share at the 1-digit ISCO level 
would lead to biased results.
Once we have merged the average shares, the next step is to apply weights using 
the country-specific ISCO’s employment shares. By proceeding this way, we obtain 
a share of individuals able to work from home that varies across countries. This is 
due to the fact that countries have different sectoral/occupational employment struc-
tures. Figure 1 presents the shares of individuals potentially able to work from home 
by country. While the average share of individuals able to work from home is 12% 
for the entire LAC region, the proportion of individuals able to work from home 
varies across countries from 7.5 to 16%. The country with the lowest share of tel-
eworkability in our sample is Nicaragua while the country with the highest share is 
Barbados.
We compare our teleworkability index with other measures. More specifically, 
we construct the teleworkability index following the approach of Dingel and Nei-
man (2020) using US-based measures. Overall, our measure indicates a lower esti-
mated share of teleworkability, which confirms the presumption that O*NET-based 
measure overestimates the teleworking capacity of developing countries (Gottlieb 
et al. 2021; Hatayama et al. 2020). We also compare the shares that we obtain for 
specific countries with the shares obtained in existing studies using real-time data 
and conclude that our findings are in line with those of studies using real-time shares 
of people in homeworking. For instance, Leone (2020) finds virtually the same share 
for Brazil and Gottlieb et al. (2021) present evidence for Costa Rica, where 10.8% of 
urban workers worked remotely in the second quarter of 2020. The National Institute 
of Statistics of Chile reported a teleworking share of 22.1% in the month of April of 
12 For more information about the methodology applied to construct the 2-digit ISCO-08 variable, see 
Appendix B of the GLO discussion paper (GLO DP 682 [pre]).
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202013 (Instituto Nacional de Estadı́stica de Chile 2020), while IPSOS (2020) con-
ducted a nationally representative urban survey in Peru and found that, in June 2020, 
12% of the respondents were working from home. These statistics provide support to 
our findings.
We examine how the share of individuals able to work from home varies within 
countries across occupations (Appendix, Table  4). The results show that a larger 
proportion of workers are able to work from home among higher skilled occupa-
tions. For instance, the share of teleworkability is higher among clerical support 
workers (45% for the full sample), professionals (31% for the full sample), managers 
(29% for the full sample) and technicians and associate professionals (26% for the 
full sample). It is much lower for plant and machine operators and assemblers, as 
well as for agricultural workers and individuals in elementary occupations.
Across economic activities (Appendix, Table 5), the highest share of telework-
ability is found in financial insurance and the real estate sector (31% for the full 
sample). It varies however considerably across countries, from 15% in the Bahamas 
to 39% in the Dominican Republic. Teleworking is also possible for a significant 
share of individuals in social and community services as well as in the electricity, 
gas and water sector (18% and 17% respectively for the full sample). However, as 
expected, individuals are much less likely to be able to work from home when they 
work in agriculture (0.007% for the full sample).
Lastly, we examine how the share of teleworkability differs across population 
groups (Appendix, Table 6). The results for the full sample indicate that men are 
less likely to be able to work from home compared to women (10% compared to 
15%). A larger teleworkability share is found as well among individuals that have a 
higher level of education and that live in an urban area. Informal workers are more 
affected: only 7% of them are able to work from home compared to 18% of the for-
mal workers. Lastly, individuals in the top of the labour income distribution have 
higher capacity to work from home compared to those in the bottom part (21% com-
pared to only 7% of the individuals in the bottom quintile). Our results are largely 
consistent with previous research examining the feasibility to work from home 
across occupations, economic activities and population groups (Dingel and Neiman 
2020; Delaporte and Peña 2020; Gottlieb et al. 2021; Hatayama et al. 2020).
2.3  The Lockdown Working Ability (LWA) index under perfect compliance
The stay-at-home orders do not apply to all economic activities. Certain activities 
have remained open, either because they are considered as essential or because some 
LAC countries have implemented a partial lockdown. On the opposite, other activi-
ties have ceased completely to operate. Lastly, some activities that are not explic-
itly stated as essential or closed have been affected by mobility restrictions. This 
needs to be taken into account when estimating the share of individuals able to 
remain active under the lockdown. Therefore, following Palomino et al. (2020) and 
13 This share includes workers that are working from home both fully and partially. This can explain 
why this share is relatively higher than the teleworking share that we have found for Chile.
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Fig. 1  Share of individuals potentially able to work from home, by country. Source: Harmonised House-
hold Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean, authors’ own calculations. Notes: The average share 
of individuals able to work from home (represented by the vertical red line) is 12% for the entire LAC 
region. The LAC share was calculated as a weighted average of the population in all countries, excluding 
Argentina and the Bahamas, which are not representative at the national level
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Duman (2020), we construct the LWA index under perfect compliance which can be 
expressed as follows:
where O refers to open economic activities and C to closed economic activities. 
Ti refers to the teleworkability index of individual i . In other words, when a certain 
economic activity is open, we assume that the workers are not affected by the lock-
down regardless of their capacity to work from home. On the opposite, when a cer-
tain economic activity is closed, we assume that working is not possible, regardless 
of the fact that the job can be performed at home. The feasibility to work from home 
matters only for the remaining economic activities.
Our LWA measure might have some limitations which should be underlined. 
First, we assume that all individuals working in sectors that are open are able to 
remain active. This might not be the case if the jobs in sectors that are open are 
affected by a drop in demand or by distancing measures at work (some workers 
could have been fired or furloughed).14 Besides, we assume that the workers in these 
sectors retain their pre-lockdown level of hours worked per week. We also acknowl-
edge the possibility that some workers in the sectors that are open might perform 
their job from home. This, however, does not affect our conclusions since, no matter 
where they decide to work, the number of hours worked should remain the same, as 
their labour income.
Second, for individuals who work in sectors that are closed, we assume that they 
can no longer work and therefore do not receive their salary. This might not be the 
case for all individuals. Some workers might have continued to receive their salary, 
regardless of the fact that their occupation is affected by legal workplace closures, 
either because of the rigidity of their contracts or because they are able to perform 
certain tasks from home. In this case, they would have received the totality or part of 
their salary.15 Finally, in the case of the remaining sectors that are affected by mobil-
ity restrictions, we assume that all the workers that are able to work from home do 
so. Yet, some workers might have been fired or furloughed irrespective of their abil-
ity to work from home.
To proceed with the estimation of the LWA index, we need to classify the eco-
nomic activities into three categories: (i) the activities that are explicitly stated as 
closed, (ii) the activities that are explicitly stated as open and (iii) the remaining 
activities affected by mobility restrictions. We gather detailed information from 
national laws, decrees and press releases for each country in our sample. The deci-




1 if ai = O
Ti if ai ≠ O, C
0 if ai = C
14 We also rule out cases in which workers stopped to work as a precautionary measure, even when the 
sector remained open.
15 We also acknowledge the fact that governments implemented and/or expanded social protection pro-
grammes aimed at covering labour income falls; we discuss this later.
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the sectoral level. Therefore, we conduct this classification at the sectoral level. The 
only available variable for sectors that has been harmonised by the IADB in the 
household surveys is at the 1-digit level. This gives us nine different sectors.16 Hav-
ing such a general definition of the economic activities does not allow us to identify 
precisely which sectors were closed or open. Therefore, we use the non-harmonised 
version of the sectoral classification available in each survey which is more detailed 
and employ a crosswalk between the national classifications (often at the 4-digit 
level) and the harmonised classification ISIC revision 4. For some countries, we use 
a crosswalk from the national classification to ISIC Rev 3.1 and then to ISIC Rev 
4.17 By following this procedure, we obtain a more detailed and harmonised defini-
tion of economic activities (at the 2-digit or division level).
We now proceed with the classification of the sectors into open and closed activi-
ties. Since countries in the LAC region have implemented different lockdown poli-
cies, it is important to identify in each country which sectors are open and which are 
closed, as well as the duration of the first phase of the lockdown.18 The estimated 
start date of the lockdown is the date at which the country entered into a lockdown 
while the estimated end date of the lockdown is the date at which considerable reo-
pening of industry and/or services took place under certain conditions. Some coun-
tries have adopted a regional approach where the lockdown measures differ across 
regions. This is the case of Brazil for which we identify the classification of the 
sectors as well as the duration of the lockdown at the state level. For other countries 
such as Argentina and Chile, the duration of the lockdown differs across regions but 
the classification of the sectors remains the same.
Figure 2 presents the lockdown intensity and duration by country. In particular, 
Fig.  2a reports for each country the proportion of workers in (i) sectors that are 
closed, (ii) sectors affected by mobility restrictions and (iii) sectors that are open.19 
16 The nine sectors are the following: “Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing”; “Mining and quarry-
ing”; “Manufacturing industries”; “Electricity, gas, and water”; “Construction”; “Wholesale and retail 
trade, restaurants, and hotels”; “Transport and storage”; “Financial services, insurance, and real estate” 
and “Social, community and personal services”.
17 For a detailed explanation of the procedure, see Appendix B of the GLO discussion paper (GLO DP 
682 [pre]).
18 The list of laws and decrees reviewed, as well as the estimated duration of the lockdown and the clas-
sification of the sectors, is reported specifically for each country in Appendix C of the GLO discussion 
paper (GLO DP 682 [pre]). Our results are in general consistent with the Oxford COVID-19 Govern-
ment Response Tracker (OxCGRT) in terms of the approximate duration of the lockdowns. Concern-
ing our definition of economic sectors at the 2-digit level, for some sectors, the definition is too general 
to identify some of the activities mentioned in the laws and decrees. A paramount example of this is 
“public transportation” which, in some countries, was closed during the lockdown. This activity appears 
in the ISIC Rev 4 under “Urban and suburban passenger land transport” at the 4-digit level and is part 
of the 2-digit category 49 “Land transport and transport via pipelines”. However, the division 49 also 
comprises other activities that were not closed. Since our definition is at the 2-digit level, we apply the 
following rule: if the proportion of workers in the class “Urban and suburban passenger land transport” 
was the largest compared to the other classes and “public transportation” was closed, then we assume the 
division 49 to be closed entirely.
19 For Brazil, we report in Fig. 2a the classification of the capital. However, in the calculations, we use 
a different classification across states. This information is available in Figure C.1 of Appendix C in the 
GLO discussion paper (GLO DP 682 [pre]).
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Figure 2b reports the estimated lockdown duration (in days) for all the countries that 
have adopted a national approach.20
We find strong differences across countries in the type of lockdown that was 
implemented. Nicaragua is the only country in our sample that did not implement 
a lockdown. Therefore, all the workers in Nicaragua are potentially able to remain 
active. Paraguay and Uruguay have the lowest proportions of workers in sectors 
that are closed. Yet, Paraguay has imposed a stricter lockdown than Uruguay. As 
a result, almost all the workers in Uruguay are potentially able to remain active 
under the lockdown, whereas in Paraguay, it depends additionally on the capac-
ity of individuals to work from home. On the other extreme of the spectrum, the 
Bahamas and Argentina have the highest proportions of individuals that are work-
ing in closed sectors (28% and 29% respectively). Countries such as the Dominican 
Republic, Barbados or Peru also have a high proportion of workers that are unable 
to work (around 17–18%). Lastly, the highest proportion of workers in sectors that 
are affected by mobility restrictions is found in El Salvador with 49% of the workers 
required to work from home. Therefore, the ability to remain active for these work-
ers rests essentially on their capacity to perform their job from home. There are also 
strong differences across countries in terms of the duration of the first phase of the 
lockdown. In this respect, Guatemala has implemented the longest lockdown at the 
national level (132 days).
Based on the sectoral classifications and on individuals’ teleworking capacity, we 
can now construct the LWA index. Figure 3 reports the share of individuals poten-
tially able to remain active under the first phase of the lockdown in each country. 
These proportions differ from the ones reported in Fig. 2a since the individuals who 
are able to remain active can be among (i) the individuals who work in sectors that 
are open and (ii) the individuals who are able to work from home among those who 
work in sectors that are affected by mobility restrictions. The results show that, on 
average, 1 worker out of 2 is potentially able to work under the lockdown in the entire 
LAC region. This proportion varies from 37% in Argentina to 100% in Nicaragua.
We examine further how this share varies within countries across occupations, 
economic activities and specific population groups. The share of individuals able 
to work under the lockdown differs across occupations (Appendix, Table  7). The 
highest share of workers potentially able to remain active is found among skilled 
agricultural, forestry and fishery workers (97% for the full sample). A high share is 
found as well among professionals (82% for the full sample), clerical support work-
ers (72% for the full sample), technicians and associate professionals (63% for the 
full sample) and managers (56% for the full sample). On the opposite, individuals 
who work as craft and related trades workers as well as plant and machine operators 
and assemblers are less likely to be able to work under the lockdown (23% and 42% 
respectively for the full sample). Unsurprisingly, there are important differences 
across countries since it depends on the strictness of the lockdown. For instance, 
20 The estimated duration of the lockdown varies across regions in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. For 
the sake of simplicity, we do not report the estimated duration for these countries in Fig. 2b. The duration 
of the lockdown at the regional level in these countries is available in Appendix C of the GLO discussion 
paper (GLO DP 682 [pre]).
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only 50% of the workers in agriculture are able to remain active in the Bahamas, 
compared to 100% of their peers in Nicaragua.
The proportion of individuals potentially able to work during the lockdown also 
varies across economic activities (Appendix, Table 8). The highest share is found in 
agriculture as well as in the electricity, gas and water sector (100% for the full sample). 
This result does not differ much across countries. A significant share of individuals are 
able to work as well in mining and quarrying (88% for the full sample), in financial 
insurance and real estate (65% for the full sample) and in the transport and storage sec-
tor (65% for the full sample). These shares differ however substantially depending on 
the country that is examined. The lowest share of individuals able to work during the 
lockdown is found in the construction sector (11% for the full sample).
Lastly, we investigate how the capacity to work under the lockdown differs across 
individuals (Appendix, Table 9). A larger proportion of men are able to work dur-
ing the lockdown compared to women (56% compared to 53% for the full sample). 
Besides, a higher proportion of highly educated individuals are able to remain active 
compared to individuals with lower educational attainment (57% compared to 52% 
for the full sample). Individuals living in rural areas are more likely to be able to 
remain active compared to workers in urban areas (72% compared to 51% for the 
full sample). A higher proportion of formal workers are able to remain active as well 
compared to informal workers (60% compared to 50% for the full sample). Lastly, 
a larger share of individuals in the top of the labour income distribution are able to 
remain active under the lockdown compared to those in the bottom part (63% com-
pared to 55% of the individuals in the bottom quintile for the full sample).
2.4  The Lockdown Working Ability (LWA) index under imperfect compliance
We have assumed so far that the lockdown policies have been fully enforced and 
respected in all LAC countries. In other words, we have assumed that de facto and 
de jure lockdowns are the same; thus, there is perfect compliance. However, a num-
ber of recent studies have shown that de facto lockdowns are very different from 
de jure lockdowns, especially in developing countries (Maloney and Taskin 2020; 
Galasso et  al 2020). Indeed, government capabilities to enforce are weaker, and 
resistance is often higher since the trade-off with livelihood is harsher in developing 
countries. Yeyati and Sartorio (2020a) show that people’s capability and willing-
ness to comply with restrictive policies is lower in countries with lower incomes and 
higher levels of labour precariousness. It is also lower in countries with stricter and 
longer quarantines. Besides, compliance is related to the pre-crisis level of trust in 
policy makers (Bargain and Aminjonov 2020) and to pre-crisis social responsible 
behaviour (Müller and Rau 2021), which differ across countries. Therefore, assum-
ing perfect compliance is likely to lead to biased estimates. To address this concern, 
Fig. 2  Lockdown intensity and duration, by country. a Share of workers in closed, restricted and open 
sectors, by country. b Lockdown duration, by country. Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and National Laws, Decrees and Press Releases, authors’ own calculations. 
Notes: In a, we report for Brazil  the classification that is in place in Brazil’s capital. Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile are not included in b since they did not adopt a national approach
▸
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Fig. 3  Share of individuals able to work under the lockdown under perfect compliance, by country. 
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean, authors’ own calculations. 
Notes: The average share of individuals able to work from home (represented by the vertical red line) is 
55% for the entire LAC region. The LAC share was calculated as a weighted average of the population 
in all countries, excluding Argentina and the Bahamas, which are not representative at the national level, 
and Nicaragua to be consistent with the scenario under imperfect compliance
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the degree of non-compliance should be taken into account when examining the fea-
sibility to remain active under a lockdown.
In order to compare the stringency of de jure lockdown policies with de facto 
compliance over time, we use the Oxford Stringency Index (OSI) compiled by the 
University of Oxford as well as Google workplace mobility data.21 More specifi-
cally, we rely on the OSI since it provides a continuous measure of the strictness of 
the lockdown policy implemented in all LAC countries. This allows us to examine 
the evolution in the level of stringency of de jure lockdowns over time. With respect 
to mobility data, we focus on workplace mobility since it is the type of mobility that 
is arguably the most closely related to the economic costs of the pandemic (Yeyati 
and Sartorio 2020a). The Google Mobility Index (GMI) estimates the variation of 
mobility relative to a baseline date previous to the pandemic. By comparing the two 
measures over time, this gives us an idea of the evolution of de facto compliance.
It should be noted that the GMI is reported at the regional level for each coun-
try. However, the OSI is reported at the national level for all LAC countries (except 
for Brazil, where the index differs across states). Therefore, in order to compute the 
degree of compliance at the regional level in each country, we have to assume a 
common stringency index across regions. Following Yeyati and Sartorio (2020a), 
we normalize both the OSI and the GMI to 0 on March 3, 2020. This allows us to 
compare the evolution of de jure and de facto lockdowns both at the regional level 
within countries and at the national level across countries. Then, we can subtract the 
normalised OSI from the normalised GMI in order to estimate the degree and evo-
lution of compliance across regions and countries. Figure 4 reports the degree and 
evolution of compliance over time in each country. The grey shaded area represents 
the first phase of the lockdown in all countries.22
The level of compliance generally varies over time in most of the countries. An 
increase in non-compliance can be observed when the level of stringency of the 
lockdown policy was higher than the drop in work mobility. Overall, lockdown com-
pliance has steadily decreased in many countries over the period of the pandemic. 
Towards the end of the first phase of the lockdown, most of the countries experience 
a decrease in compliance. The highest drop in compliance is registered in Brazil and 
Venezuela (− 58% and − 57% respectively). Furthermore, the drop in compliance 
seems to be faster in some countries than others as time passes by. As previously 
mentioned, there are many potential reasons behind these differences in the level of 
compliance across countries.23 We document that countries characterised by lower 
21 Data on the Oxford Stringency Index can be found here: https:// www. bsg. ox. ac. uk/ resea rch/ resea 
rch- proje cts/ coron avirus- gover nment- respo nse- track er# data. Google community mobility reports are 
publicly available here: https:// www. google. com/ covid 19/ mobil ity/. Additionally, Yeyati and Sartorio 
(2020b) provide an already compiled and freely accessible database that includes all the necessary infor-
mation. For more information, see: https:// www. utdt. edu/ ver_ conte nido. php? id_ conte nido= 20336 & id_ 
item_ menu= 32611
22 For Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the start and the end dates of the first phase of the lockdown vary 
across regions. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, we report the dates of the capitals in Fig. 4.
23 We examine the relationship between non-compliance and some indicators of development, labour 
market conditions and institutionality. The results are not reported in this paper. However, it is reported in 
Figure A.2 of Appendix A in the GLO discussion paper (GLO DP 682 [pre]).
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levels of development, weak institutionality and higher levels of labour precarious-
ness, in particular with a larger share of workers in informality, are more likely to 
have lower levels of compliance, a phenomenon that was also documented by Yeyati 
and Sartorio (2020a). Second, countries that have implemented longer and stricter 
quarantines are more likely to have a lower level of compliance as time goes by. In 
addition, countries with limited coverage of social assistance programmes during 
the pandemic might have experienced faster drops in compliance compared to coun-
tries with higher coverage. Another potential explanation is the way political leaders 
have framed the pandemic in their public speeches (Ajzenman et al. 2020).
Therefore, assuming perfect compliance is likely to lead to a biased estimation of 
the potential share of individuals who are able to remain active. In order to allow for 
some degree of non-compliance, we modify the expression of the Lockdown Work-
ing Ability measure as follows:
where O refers to open economic activities and C to closed economic activities. 
Ti refers to the teleworkability index of individual i and NCj to non-compliance in 
country j . In other words, when a certain economic activity is open, we assume 
that the workers are not affected by the lockdown regardless of their capacity to 
work from home. On the opposite, when a certain economic activity is closed, 
we assume that although individuals are not supposed to work, a proportion of 
workers remain active due to non-compliance. Lastly, for the remaining activities, 
individuals who can work from home remain active. In addition, among those who 
cannot work from home, we assume that a share of individuals remain active due to 
non-compliance.
To include non-compliance in our LWA estimation, we use the lockdown 
compliance index presented in Fig.  4. More specifically, since the level of 
compliance varies over time and we calculate our LWA at one point in time, we 
proxy non-compliance as the average over the period of the first phase of the 
lockdown in each region within countries. At the national level, our non-compliance 
measure indicates that non-compliance varies on average from 10% in Barbados to 
45% in Guatemala during their respective lockdowns. We also implicitly assume 
that the value of the index can be a proxy for the percentage of people required to 









NCj if ai ≠ O,C
0 + NCj if ai = C
24 This assumption has the limitation that we are using a percentage for non-compliance that is not 
strictly derived from data with individuals reporting non-compliance with lockdowns as the measure-
ment unit. However, surveys that have tried to capture this information are scarce. We still compare our 
proxy of non-compliance with measures obtained from surveys and find no significant difference. For 
instance, one survey conducted by Unicef-Argentina interviewed 2,678 households with children at the 
national level between the 8th and the 15th of April, 2020, and found that in 18% of the households, at 
least one member was not complying with the lockdown (Berho and Beccaria 2020). This percentage is 
close to our estimated average level of non-compliance for the city of Buenos Aires (21%).
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Fig. 4  Evolution of lockdown compliance, by country. Source: Oxford Stringency Index and Google 
Workplace Mobility Data, authors’ own calculations. Notes: Compliance is computed by subtracting the 
normalised Oxford Stringency Index (OSI) from the normalized Google Mobility Index (GMI). A nega-
tive number indicates non-compliance. Both indices were normalized to 0 on March 3, 2020. Since com-
pliance is conditional on having a lockdown, changes in lockdown compliance cannot be observed for 
Nicaragua. Furthermore, the OSI has not been computed for the Bahamas. Therefore, compliance cannot 
be observed. The grey shaded area represents the first phase of the lockdown in all countries. For coun-
tries that have adopted a regional approach, we use the lockdown duration of the capitals
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we assume that this level of non-compliance is the same across sectors. In other 
words, workers within closed sectors and workers in sectors that have been affected 
by mobility restrictions are both likely not to comply.25 We consider this procedure 
to be consistent with our framework and intuitive enough (as we do not make further 
assumptions by imposing restrictions on the nature of non-compliance) to unveil 
the role of non-compliance in the ability to remain active under lockdowns and to 
understand the links between non-compliance and socio-economic background. 
However, we acknowledge that this exercise has some limitations apart from the 
ones already mentioned. One of them is that we might overestimate the potential 
share of individuals able to remain active under the lockdown. Therefore, the shares 
should be interpreted as upper bounds of the true proportion of workers that remain 
active.
We now compute the LWA measure under de facto compliance (Fig.  5). The 
proportions represented in blue are the same shares documented previously under 
perfect compliance while the added proportions in red are for each country the 
additional share of individuals that are potentially able to remain active under the 
lockdown due to non-compliance.
We find large differences across countries since LAC countries exhibit 
very different levels of compliance; yet, when we take non-compliance into 
account, the potential ability to work during the lockdowns increases in all 
countries. Non-compliance is the lowest in countries such as Costa Rica and 
Uruguay. Among other reasons, this is likely due to the type of lockdown 
policy that was implemented. Costa Rica and Uruguay did not implement a 
strict lockdown compared to other LAC countries, thus decreasing the need and 
urge for individuals not to comply. In the opposite, countries such as Brazil and 
Venezuela have higher levels of non-compliance. As a result, the additional share 
of individuals potentially able to remain active due to a scenario of imperfect 
compliance is higher in these countries. Overall, by taking into account the 
possibility that individuals do not comply with the social distancing rules, we find 
that the proportion of individuals potentially able to remain active varies from 
54% in Argentina to 96% in Uruguay.26 At the level of the LAC region, the average 
share of individuals potentially able to work is 72%.
We examine further how the incremental shares differ within countries across 
occupations, economic activities and specific population groups. This exercise also 
allows us to examine the characteristics of potential non-compliers. The increase in 
the share of individuals potentially able to work under the lockdown due to de facto 
compliance differs across occupations (Appendix, Table 10). The highest increase 
in the proportion of workers able to remain active due to imperfect compliance is 
found among craft and related trades workers (28 pp increase for the full sample). A 
significant increase is found as well among service and sales workers (22 pp for the 
25 We acknowledge that non-compliance might be more difficult in some sectors than others. For 
instance, it could be more difficult not to comply when working in closed sectors compared to working in 
sectors affected by mobility restrictions.
26 The Bahamas and Nicaragua are not included in this exercise since compliance in these countries can-
not be computed.
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full sample), plant and machine operators and assemblers (21 pp for the full sample) 
and workers in elementary occupations (21 pp for the full sample). On the oppo-
site, the share of active workers among professionals and technicians and associ-
ate professionals is increasing to a lower extent due to non-compliance. Overall, we 
document that potential non-compliers are concentrated, on average, in low-skilled 
occupations.
The increase in the potential to work during the lockdown also varies across eco-
nomic activities (Appendix, Table  11). The highest increase in the proportion of 
workers able to remain active due to imperfect compliance is found in the construc-
tion sector (31 pp increase for the full sample) as well as in manufacturing industries 
(24 pp increase for the full sample). There is no significant change in the proportion 
of individuals that are able to remain active in agriculture and in the electricity, gas 
and water sector.
Lastly, we investigate how the incremental shares differ across individuals 
(Appendix, Table 12). As a result of non-compliance, a similar increase is observed 
among men and women on average (around 17–18 pp increase for the full sample). 
As expected, there is a higher level of non-compliance among individuals that have a 
lower level of education and who live in urban areas. There is also a higher increase 
in the share of informal workers compared to formal workers (18 pp increase com-
pared to 16 pp increase). Lastly, a higher increase is observed among individuals 
in the bottom part of the total labour income distribution compared to individuals 
in the top part of the total labour income distribution (17 pp increase compared to 
14 pp increase). Overall, our results are consistent with those one would expect: the 
potential non-compliers are among the most vulnerable individuals and are the ones 
that have been the most affected by the social distancing rules.
3  Poverty and inequality changes due to COVID‑19
The asymmetry of the shock implies that the economic implications of social dis-
tancing could be significant in terms of labour income inequality and poverty rates. 
In this section, we partly follow Palomino et al. (2020). In particular, we calculate 
similar inequality measures. However, we do not simulate changes under different 
scenarios of lockdown intensity and duration. We conduct an ex-post assessment 
of the potential effects of the lockdown policies applied in each LAC country on 
poverty and labour income inequality. Furthermore, we compare the formal (de jure) 
lockdown policies with de facto compliance. The inclusion of imperfect compliance 
in our analysis allows to uncover the potential role of non-compliance as a mecha-
nism to smooth labour income losses related to lockdowns. Before presenting our 
analysis, it should be noted that we focus on the potential impact of the first phase of 
the lockdown and do not consider the potential effect of the subsequent phases that 
have for objective to organise the reopening of the economies, neither the possibil-
ity of a second lockdown. In addition, our analysis is framed in a partial equilibrium 
setting since we do not take into account other effects that might have impacted the 
labour income distribution.
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Fig. 5  Share of individuals able to work under the lockdown under imperfect compliance, by country. 
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean and Oxford Stringency 
Index and Google Workplace Mobility Data, authors’ own calculations. Notes: Two countries are not 
included: the Bahamas and Nicaragua. Since compliance is conditional on having a lockdown, lockdown 
compliance cannot be observed for Nicaragua. Furthermore, the OSI has not been computed for the 
Bahamas. The average share of individuals able to work under the lockdown (represented by the vertical 
red line) is 72% for the entire LAC region. The LAC share was calculated as a weighted average of the 
population in all countries, excluding Argentina and the Bahamas, which are not representative at the 
national level, and Nicaragua to be consistent with the scenario under imperfect compliance
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3.1  Potential labour income losses and inequality measures
To examine the potential impact of enforced social distancing on poverty and labour 
income inequality, the first step is to calculate the potential labour income loss due 
to the lockdown for all individuals. The labour income loss is calculated as follows:
where wlit is the labour income loss of individual i in period t . wit−1 is the annual 
labour income27 of individual i in period t − 1 (before the lockdown) and Dj repre-







 for 60 days, etc. The duration of the lockdown differs across coun-
tries and, for some countries, across regions.28 Lastly, LWAi represents the capac-
ity for individual i to remain active and to receive his salary during the period of 
the lockdown.29 We estimate the labour income losses subsequently under two 
scenarios: (i) under perfect compliance with LWAi and (ii) under imperfect compli-
ance with LWANC
i
 . To provide an example, for individuals that work in open sec-
tors, the LWA index is assumed to be 1. Therefore, the expression for the labour 
income losses is equal to 0. This means that the individuals that are able to remain 
active under the lockdown do not experience labour income losses. Thus, the labour 
income loss experienced by workers under a lockdown is the proportion of annual 
labour income they lose due to their inability to work during the lockdown period. 
The estimated labour income losses allow us to evaluate the potential changes in 
poverty and labour income inequality under the first phase of the lockdown in each 
LAC country.
An important point to note here is that, since we focus our attention on labour 
income, we do not capture the effects of government transfers and subsidies put 
in place to help households and individuals. Such effects would be captured at the 
household income level. In addition, we are not capturing the support of some gov-
ernments to pay a share of the payroll of some formal employees. However, knowing 
whether and to which extent aid programmes (for employment or income protection) 
were implemented during the pandemic in the LAC region can be informative for 
our study. Therefore, we provide a summary of the programmes which were explic-
itly targeting informal workers or aiming at having an effect on the labour income 
of formal workers in the Appendix, Table 13. Busso and Messina (2020) and Busso 
et  al. (2020) discuss the generosity of the emergency transfers in 10 LAC coun-
tries and find a good potential coverage among the poorest households, reaching 
more than 75% of the poorest tercile in the population in most countries. However, 
(3)wlit = wit−1.Dj(1 − LWAi)
27 We use the harmonised monetary total labour income available in our surveys.
28 See Appendix C Table C.2 in the GLO discussion paper (GLO DP 682 [pre]) for an approximation of 
the duration of the lockdown.
29 We assume that all the workers that are able to remain active receive their entire labour income. In 
other words, the workers do not experience any wage cuts or reduction in the number of working hours. 
Besides, we exclude the possibility that individuals switch to another occupation.
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coverage is lower in the second tercile.30 Therefore, these emergency measures 
should be kept in mind since they are likely to attenuate some of the distributive 
effects of the lockdown policies.
To examine the changes in poverty and inequality, we calculate a series of meas-
ures which we define, before presenting the results. First, we calculate the loss rate 







with wit = wit−1 − wlit . We order individuals by their pre-lockdown labour income 
and group them into percentiles, obtaining the mean loss rate at each percentile. 
This gives us the Lockdown Incidence Curve (LIC), which allows us to examine 
which part of the labour income distribution suffers the largest relative loss. In other 
words, it provides a simple illustration of the changes between the pre-lockdown 
period and the period at the end of the first phase of the lockdown for each percen-
tile.31 We estimate two LIC curves for each country: the first one under perfect com-
pliance and the second under imperfect compliance. This allows us to compare the 
distributional effects of the formal de jure lockdowns with de facto compliance. We 
also examine how the mean loss labour income rate varies across occupations, eco-
nomic activities and population groups under the two scenarios.
Then, we calculate the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indices which are a family of pov-
erty metrics. These indices are derived by substituting different values of the param-
eter ∝ into the following equation:
where z is the poverty threshold; N is the number of people in the economy; H 
is the number of poor (those with labour incomes at or below z ); wi is the labour 
income of each individual i . If ∝ is low, the FGT metric weights all the individu-










30 Busso et  al. (2020) document a good potential coverage of the emergency social assistance pro-
grammes among the poorest households. However, there is substantial variation across countries. For 
instance, coverage in Chile and Ecuador reaches approximately half of the households in the first tercile, 
whereas in Brazil and Peru it is almost universal. Coverage is lower in the second tercile. For instance, 
in Colombia, Ecuador and Dominican Republic, potential coverage rates in the second tercile are below 
40%. Regarding the generosity of these transfers, the replacement rate for those in the first tercile is gen-
erally high, but there are exceptions. In Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Peru, the median replace-
ment rate is 50% or more of the regular labour income. Argentina and Colombia are intermediate cases, 
with median replacement rates in the first tercile around 40%. The replacement rate is the lowest in the 
Dominican Republic and Uruguay (34 and 12%, respectively). The potential replacement rates are much 
lower among households in the second tercile. While the transfer exceeds 50% of the regular labour earn-
ings for the median beneficiary household in Brazil and in El Salvador, transfers represent less than 15% 
of the prior and potentially forgone labour earnings of the median household in Bolivia, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.
31 Per Palomino, Rodríguez and Sebastian (2020), it also allows us to check the Pigou-Dalton transfer 
principle. In other words, if the labour income loss is increasing (decreasing) across the labour income 
distribution, then inequality falls (rises) with the lockdown for all inequality measures satisfying the 
Pigou–Dalton transfer principle.
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the weight placed on the poorest individuals. We calculate FGT0 , FGT1 and FGT2 . 
FGT0 is the headcount ratio. It is the fraction of workers that live below the inter-
national poverty line of $5 (PPP) per person per day.32 With ∝= 1 , FGT1 is the pov-
erty gap index. Lastly, FGT2 measures the intensity/severity of poverty. We com-
pute these measures for the pre-lockdown period as well as for the period at the end 
of the first phase of the lockdown.33 In addition, we calculate the absolute changes 
denoted as follows: ΔAFGT0 , ΔAFGT1 and ΔAFGT2 . Lastly, we calculate the meas-
ures subsequently under perfect and imperfect compliance.
With respect to changes in labour income inequality, we calculate the Gini coef-
ficient (G) and the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) index. The Gini coefficient 
can be expressed as follows:
where w represents the labour income distribution, wi is the labour income of 
individual i and  is the mean labour income of the economy. The absolute changes 
in labour income inequality are measured as the difference between the pre-lock-
down labour income distribution and the labour income distribution at the end of the 








 , while the relative changes in 
labour income inequality are measured as percentages of pre-lockdown inequality, 
i.e. ΔRG = G(wt)−G(wt−1)
G(wt−1)
× 100. We also estimate these changes subsequently under 
perfect and imperfect compliance. Second, we use the MLD index which can be 
expressed as follows:
We compute the absolute and relative changes in labour income inequality meas-





and ΔRMLD = MLD(wt)−MLD(wt−1)
MLD(wt−1)
× 100, respectively. Similarly, we estimate these 
changes subsequently under perfect and imperfect compliance. Lastly, the MLD 
index can be decomposed into a  between-group and a  within-group component. 
While the between-group component is the level of labour income inequality that 
would arise if each worker in a country enjoys the mean labour income of the coun-


















32 We use the poverty line of $5 (PPP) per person per day in order to account for moderate poverty. 
A more extreme poverty line would not properly reflect the living conditions in Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Furthermore, changes in extreme poverty are mostly explained by social transfers 
(Azevedo et  al. 2013). Since we focus on labour income inequality, it is more appropriate to examine 
changes in moderate poverty.
33 For the sake of simplicity, the results for the pre-lockdown period as well as for the period at the end 
of the first phase of the lockdown are not reported but are available upon request. We report only the 
results for the changes between the two periods.
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within different countries. We conduct the decomposition in order to estimate the 
relative contribution in overall inequality.
3.2  Impact of de jure and de facto lockdown policies on poverty and inequality
We first examine the LIC curves for each LAC country of our sample. Figure 6 provides 
the LIC curves under perfect compliance (blue curves) and the LIC curves under 
imperfect compliance (red curves). If each percentile of the earnings distribution — i.e. 
each 1% of the population earning a labour income ordered from the lowest to the highest 
group — was experiencing equal labour income losses, then the LIC curve would be 
represented by a straight line. Furthermore, if the labour income loss is decreasing across 
the labour income distribution, then inequality rises with the lockdown for all inequality 
measures satisfying the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle.
When assuming perfect compliance, the picture differs across countries. 
Indeed, there is a lot of heterogeneity across countries in terms of the levels 
and the slopes of the incidence curves. First, not all parts of the labour income 
distribution are affected similarly in all countries. For instance, in Argentina, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic and El Salvador, 
the bottom percentiles are the most affected. By contrast, in Belize, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Paraguay and Uruguay, all parts of the labour 
income distribution suffer relatively similar losses. Furthermore, when the 
bottom percentiles are affected, they are not affected in similar proportions in 
all countries. They are more disproportionately impacted in Argentina and in El 
Salvador compared to those in the Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Colombia and 
Dominican Republic. In Mexico, Paraguay and Peru, there is an increase in the 
labour income polarization since the most affected are individuals in the middle 
part of the labour income distribution.
When comparing de jure with de facto lockdowns, labour income losses are 
higher when assuming perfect compliance. However, the differences depend on the 
level of non-compliance. Not all countries have a significant degree of non-compli-
ance; and therefore, for these countries, we do not observe significant differences. 
This is the case for Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Para-
guay and Uruguay. By contrast, the differences between de jure and de facto lock-
downs are more striking in the case of Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. This is potentially due to differences in the informal 
employment rate — it is above 70% in El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. In all these 
countries, we can see that non-compliance attenuates the labour income losses of 
those that are the most affected.
Lastly, as mentioned previously, we do not include social assistance programmes that 
were implemented during the pandemic in the LAC region. However, since we know 
that the emergency transfers target primarily the poorest individuals, we can expect 
the labour income loss rate to be reduced in the lower part of the total labour income 
distribution.
To identify the potentially most affected individuals in the population, we estimate 
the mean loss labour income rate under perfect compliance across occupations, 
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economic activities and population groups. Among all occupations (Appendix, 
Table 14), craft and related trades workers suffer the largest losses. In the LAC region 
on average, their potential labour income loss amounts to 15% of their pre-lockdown 
annual labour income. Across the different economic activities (Appendix, Table 15), 
workers in the construction sector, in manufacturing industries and in the wholesale 
and retail trade sector experience important labour income losses as well. We also 
examine how the relative labour income losses vary across different population groups 
(Appendix, Table 16). The potential labour income losses do not differ significantly 
by gender as well as by level of education. However, informal workers have higher 
potential labour income losses than formal workers (10% compared to 8% for the full 
sample). Besides, workers in urban areas experience higher potential labour income 
losses (10% compared to 6% in rural areas for the full sample).
When allowing for some degree of non-compliance, the mean loss labour income 
rates are reduced. We examine the reduction in the mean loss labour income rate due 
to imperfect compliance across occupations, economic activities and population groups. 
First, across all occupations (Appendix, Table  17), craft and related trades workers 
would experience a lower drop of their pre-lockdown annual labour income due to 
imperfect compliance. This is due to the fact that these workers are among those with 
higher probability of non-compliance. Across economic activities (Appendix, Table 18), 
workers in the construction sector also experience a lower drop in their labour income on 
average. Lastly, when examining differences across individuals (Appendix, Table 19), a 
larger reduction in the labour income losses of informal workers is observed compared 
to formal workers. This directly comes from the fact that informal workers are more 
likely not to comply with social distancing rules than formal workers.34
Our results for the analysis on poverty and labour income inequality are reported 
in Table 1.35 We find an increase in the proportion of workers with a labour income 
below the international poverty line of $5 (PPP) in almost all the LAC countries. 
While the average increase in the headcount poverty index is of 1.6 pp for the LAC 
region when assuming perfect compliance, this increase is reduced to 0.8 pp when 
considering imperfect compliance. Therefore, the changes are significantly reduced 
under imperfect compliance. This is due to the fact that the potential non-compliers 
are among the most vulnerable individuals. However, we still observe an increase 
in the proportion of workers considered as poor in most of the countries. At the 
national level, the highest increase in the headcount poverty index when assuming 
perfect compliance is observed in Guatemala (6 pp increase). However, under imper-
fect compliance, the highest increase is observed in El Salvador (2.5 pp increase).
We also find that labour income inequality increases for the Gini coefficient and 
the MLD in almost all the LAC countries. The average increase in labour income 
inequality at the level of the LAC region is higher under perfect compliance (1.2 pp 
increase for the Gini coefficient and 2.1 pp for the MLD index) compared to under 
34 A similar hypothesis has been put forward in the case of informal workers in South Asia (World Bank 
2020).
35 The results for Argentina and the Bahamas are not directly comparable with the results for the other 
countries since Argentina and the Bahamas were restricted to urban areas. Therefore, we do not include 
them in the explanation of the results that follows.
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Fig. 6  Lockdown incidence curves under perfect and imperfect compliance, by country. Source: Har-
monised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean and Oxford Stringency Index and 
Google Workplace Mobility Data, authors’ own calculations. Notes: The blue curves represent the rela-
tive change in the annual labour income distribution assuming perfect compliance, while the red curves 
represent the relative changes in the annual labour income distribution when allowing for some degree of 
non-compliance. The LIC curves allow examining which part of the labour income distribution suffers 
the largest relative labour income losses. A smoother has been applied to the curves
1 3
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imperfect compliance (0.6 pp increase for the Gini coefficient and 1 pp increase for 
the MLD index). Across countries, the highest increase in the Gini coefficient under 
perfect compliance is observed in El Salvador with a 1.8 pp increase. This increase 
is reduced to 1.2 pp under imperfect compliance. Lastly, the highest increase in the 
MLD index under perfect compliance is in Brazil with a 2.5 pp increase. However, 
due to the high level of non-compliance in Brazil, this is no longer the case under 
imperfect compliance. The highest increase in the MLD index observed under de 
facto compliance is in El Salvador with a 1.5 pp increase. Overall, the inclusion of 
non-compliance attenuates the increase in poverty and inequality, and this effect is 
higher in countries with a higher level of non-compliance.
We decompose overall inequality into a between-countries and a within-countries 
component (Table  2). Our between-countries and within-countries components 
for the pre-lockdown period are consistent with what have been found previously 
in the literature (Ravallion and Chen 2012). Considering the changes between the 
two periods, our results show that social distancing has led to an increase in both 
inequality between and within countries. Yet, the between-countries inequality com-
ponent increases significantly more than the within-countries inequality component. 
One explanation to this increase in the between-countries inequality component is 
that countries with lower levels of development have experienced relatively larger 
changes in their labour income distribution (due partly to a lower teleworking capac-
ity), thus increasing inequality between countries.36 Similarly, the within-countries 
inequality component has increased due to social distancing since the lower part of 
the labour income distribution (mostly represented by socioeconomic vulnerable 
workers) has been the most affected in most of the LAC countries, exacerbating 
even further existing inequalities within countries.
The fact that inequality between countries increases more than inequality within 
countries underlines the fact that the main changes in labour income inequality due 
to social distancing have happened between LAC countries.
When non-compliance is taken into account, our results on the decomposition 
of overall inequality differ in magnitude. Indeed, there is a smaller increase in both 
inequality between and within countries. This is not a surprising result since, within 
countries, the potential non-compliers are more likely to be among the poorest indi-
viduals, thus reducing the increase in inequality. Similarly, the countries that have 
lower levels of compliance are, in general, also the countries with lower levels of 
development and weaker institutionality (see Figure A.2 in Appendix A in the GLO 
discussion paper (GLO DP 682 [pre])), thus decreasing inequality between coun-
tries. Lastly, our results indicate that inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean 
is still largely explained by the within-countries component.
36 In addition, we have computed the LIC curve at the level of the LAC region (not reported in the 
paper). This analysis shows that the labour income loss rate is larger in the lower part of the LAC labour 
income distribution, where the poorest countries of the region are over-represented compared to that in 
the upper part of the distribution where the most developed countries are. This contributes to explain 
why we find an increase in inequality between countries.
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3.3  Sources of labour income losses
The impact of the enforced social distancing measures on poverty and labour income 
inequality differs across LAC countries for a number of reasons. First, LAC coun-
tries have implemented different lockdown policies. Not all countries have imple-
mented a lockdown. Among the countries that have implemented a lockdown, the 
social distancing policies differ in their duration and their strictness. This is likely to 
matter to explain labour income losses and changes in poverty and inequality. Sec-
ond, the observed changes in poverty and labour income inequality depend on the 
structure of the economy that is observed. Since LAC countries differ in their secto-
ral/occupational employment structure, they do not experience similar changes. The 
countries that are characterised by a higher share of jobs that cannot be performed 
from home for instance are likely to experience a higher increase in poverty and 
labour income inequality. Lastly, we have seen that a higher level of non-compliance 
leads to a lower increase in poverty and inequality.
We focus on the role of the two first parameters, namely (i) the lockdown policy 
and (ii) conditional on the implementation of a lockdown, the sectoral/occupational 
employment structure of the economy in explaining the observed labour income 
losses and leave aside non-compliance to understand better the role of the first two 
components. More specifically, we conduct a series of counterfactual exercises 
Table 2  The between- and within-countries inequality components in Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean and Oxford Stringency 
Index and Google Workplace Mobility Data, authors’ own calculations.
Notes: We apply the PPP (2011 USD) conversion factor to the total labour income in each country. ΔA is 
the absolute change in labour income inequality while ΔR is the relative change in labour income inequal-
ity (%). The LAC changes are calculated as a weighted average of the population in all countries, exclud-
ing Argentina and the Bahamas, which are not representative at the national level, and Nicaragua to be 
consistent with the scenario under imperfect compliance. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Numbers have been rounded.
Gini MLD MLDBT % MLDWT %
Under perfect compliance
  Baseline 0.49 0.48 0.019 4.0 0.461 96.0
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.002)
  Lockdown 0.50 0.50 0.023 4.6 0.478 95.4
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.002)
  ∆A 0.012 0.021 0.004 0.017
  ∆R (%) 2.5 4.3 19.8 3.7
Under imperfect compliance
  Baseline 0.49 0.48 0.019 4.0 0.461 96.0
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.002)
  Lockdown 0.50 0.49 0.021 4.3 0.469 95.7
(0.001) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.005)
  ∆A 0.006 0.010 0.002 0.008
  ∆R (%) 1.3 2.1 9.9 1.8
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under the scenario of perfect compliance. Our counterfactual exercise consists of 
assigning to all countries the same lockdown policy, which was implemented in the 
country that we select as the benchmark. We do this 19 times to subsequently select 
each country’s lockdown policy (in terms of strictness and duration) as the bench-
mark.37 The rationale behind this exercise is to eliminate cross-country differences 
in the lockdown policy and to observe the changes, knowing that the changes that 
are observed are now only due to the sectoral/occupational employment structure of 
the economies. Borrowing from Caselli (2005), we calculate a measure of the inter-
percentile differential which can be expressed as follows:
This measure compares what the 90th to 10th percentile ratio would be in the 
counterfactual world with common lockdown policy, to the actual value. In other words, 
it calculates the dispersion of the labour income loss in all the countries under the same 
social distancing measures, the only difference left being the sectoral/occupational 
employment structure. This allows us to analyse the impact of each parameter 
separately: (i) the changes in labour income losses due to the lockdown policy and (ii) 
conditional on the implementation of a lockdown, the changes in labour income losses 
due to the sectoral/occupational employment structure of the economy.
We compute the inter-percentile ratio using wage losses adjusted by the purchas-
ing power parity (PPP 2011 USD) factor conversion from local currency units to 
international dollars. The values we get for the inter-percentile ratio range from 70 
to 84%, the simple average being 75%.38 This means that, conditional on applying a 
lockdown, the fraction of the cross-country labour income loss dispersion explained 
by the sectoral/occupational employment structure of LAC countries is, on average, 
75%. In our framework, the rest would be explained by the type of lockdown (dura-
tion and strictness) that was implemented. This result highlights the importance of 
considering the sectoral/occupational employment structure of the country when 
implementing lockdowns, as this is a key factor in determining the magnitude and 
dispersion of potential labour income losses and therefore the impacts on poverty 
and labour income inequality.
4  Conclusion
To prevent the spread of COVID-19, countries around the world have put in place 
broad social distancing policies. One of the implications is that many individu-







38 The value of the numerator of Eq. 7 changes according to the lockdown policy that is taken as the 
benchmark.
37 Nicaragua’s “no lockdown” policy is left out from the exercise since it is conditional on having a 
lockdown. Furthermore, for the countries that have adopted a regional approach (Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile), we apply to all countries the lockdown policy that was implemented in the capital.
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potential distributional consequences of the first phase of the lockdowns on pov-
erty and labour income inequality in 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
Besides, this study provides an informative comparison of the effects between de 
jure and de facto lockdowns. While the former assumes perfect compliance, de facto 
lockdowns are characterised by some degree of non-compliance.
Our results show a sizeable potential increase in poverty in almost all LAC coun-
tries. Under perfect compliance, the highest increase in the headcount poverty index 
is observed in Guatemala with a 6  pp increase. We also find that labour income 
inequality increases for the Gini coefficient and the MLD in almost all countries. 
The highest increase in the Gini coefficient is observed in El Salvador, reaching a 
1.8 pp increase. Similarly, the highest increase in the MLD index is in Brazil with a 
2.5 pp increase. The changes in poverty and labour income inequality are still posi-
tive when examining de facto compliance. However, the changes have been reduced, 
thus revealing the potential role of non-compliance in LAC countries as a coping 
strategy during the lockdowns.
Our results also highlight that lockdown measures are likely to worsen inequal-
ity in Latin America and the Caribbean both between and within countries. Our 
decomposition exercise shows that between-countries inequality increases by 19.8% 
under perfect compliance (9.9% under imperfect compliance) and within-countries 
inequality increases by 3.7% under perfect compliance (1.8% under imperfect com-
pliance). The observed increase in between-countries inequality is due to the fact 
that countries with lower levels of development have been hit relatively harder. This 
is still the case under imperfect compliance even though it is a lower increase since 
poorer countries have lower levels of compliance. Similarly, within-country inequal-
ity increases since the lower part of the labour income distribution has been affected 
the most in most of the countries. This increase is attenuated under imperfect com-
pliance though since the potential non-compliers are more likely to be among the 
most vulnerable individuals.
A number of factors can explain these observed differences in the changes in poverty 
and inequality across countries. First, the sectoral employment structure of each country 
plays an important role in explaining the impact of the shock on employment equilibria. 
Indeed, these differences in sectoral employment structures lead to differences in tele-
working capacity. Countries with higher shares of teleworkability are better prepared to 
affront lockdowns and workers are relatively more protected against unemployment and 
labour income drops. These differences in terms of teleworking capacity across countries 
can be exacerbated by technological change: over the period of the pandemic, countries 
have probably shifted towards higher teleworking capacity.
Yet, additional factors matter to explain why the impact of the pandemic differs 
across countries. Our results indicate a different mapping of the shock under imperfect 
compliance compared to the situation in which there is perfect compliance. The level 
of development, level of informality in labour markets and government effectiveness 
are factors that can explain this observed cross-country heterogeneity. However, we 
acknowledge that our partial approach does not capture the full set of mappings that this 
exogenous shock has had in the labour markets; in particular, we assume that there are 
no changes in the demand for labour not related with the lockdowns. Yet, there might 
be other potential factors influencing the full set of new equilibria.
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Appendix
Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19.
Table 3  Individual-level data sources
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean, authors’ own calculations
Notes: For each country, we selected the latest harmonised survey available, except for Costa Rica for 
which we selected the year 2013. The reason for this is that this survey provides a variable at the 4-digit 
level needed to construct our standardised 2-digit ISIC classification. From 2014 onwards, this variable 
does not appear in the survey






Survey name Sample size
Argentinaa ARG 2019 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares – Continua (EPHC) 115,748
Bahamasa BHS 2014 Labour Force Survey (LFS) 6705
Barbados BRB 2015 Continuous Labour Force Sample Survey (CLFSS) 13,579
Belize BLZ 2007 Labour Force Survey (LFS) 8940
Bolivia BOL 2018 Encuesta de Hogares (ECH) 37,517
Brazil BRA 2015 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilio (PNAD) 355,935
Chile CHL 2017 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica 
Nacional (CASEN)
216,439
Colombia COL 2018 Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH) 191,041
Costa Rica CRI 2013 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) 38,779
Dominican 
Republic
DOM 2019 Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo (ENFT) 20,965
Ecuador ECU 2019 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subem-
pleo (ENEMDU)
59,208
El Salvador SLV 2019 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitios Múltiples 
(EHPM)
74,448
Guatemala GTM 2019 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos (ENEI) 22,097
Jamaica JAM 2014 Labour Force Survey (LFS) 20,444
Mexico MEX 2018 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hoga-
res (ENIGH)
269,206
Nicaragua NIC 2014 Encuesta de Hogares sobre medición de Niveles de 
Vida (EMNV)
29,381
Paraguay PRY 2017 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) 35,215
Peru PER 2019 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) 124,979
Uruguay URY 2019 Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) 107,871
Venezuela VEN 2015 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo (EHM) 117,919
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Table 4  Share of individuals able to work from home, by 1-digit ISCO and by country
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean, authors’ own calculations
Notes: ISCO 1 refers to “Managers”, ISCO 2 refers to “Professionals”, ISCO 3 refers to “Technicians and 
associate professionals”, ISCO 4 refers to “Clerical support workers”, ISCO 5 refers to “Service and sales 
workers”, ISCO 6 refers to “Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers”, ISCO 7 refers to “Craft 
and related trades workers”, ISCO 8 refers to “Plant and machine operators, and assemblers” and ISCO 
9 refers to “Elementary occupations”. The shares for the entire LAC region have been calculated as a 
weighted average of the population in each country, excluding Argentina and the Bahamas, which are not 
representative at the national level. When the information was not available, we leave the cells as empty
a Sample restricted to urban areas
Countries ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4 ISCO 5 ISCO 6 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9
All 0.29 0.31 0.26 0.45 0.07 0 0.03 0.003 0.009
Argentina a 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.44 0.07 0 0.01 0.003 0.008
Bahamas a 0.25 0.35 0.21 0.43 0.06 0 0.02 0.001 0.03
Barbados 0.31 0.28 0.12 0.48 0.04 0 0.02 0.001 0.006
Belize 0.37 0.27 0.27 0.45 0.09 0 0.02 0.001 0.01
Bolivia 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.45 0.07 0 0.03 0.001 0.02
Brazil 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.45 0.06 0 0.02 0.003 0.006
Chile 0.19 0.34 0.27 0.44 0.07 0 0.02 0.001 0.01
Colombia 0.44 0.43 0.28 0.49 0.07 0 0.03 0.005 0.01
Costa Rica 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.45 0.09 0 0.03 0.002 0.008
Dominican 
Republic
0.23 0.31 0.28 0.48 0.08 0 0.02 0.002 0.007
Ecuador 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.43 0.08 0 0.03 0.002 0.01
El Salvador 0.28 0.35 0.24 0.44 0.08 0 0.03 0.003 0.009
Guatemala 0.21 0.26 0.20 0.44 0.08 0 0.05 0.002 0.01
Jamaica 0.19 0.32 0.31 0.47 0.09 0 0.02 0.001 0.01
Mexico 0.23 0.31 0.27 0.46 0.08 0 0.04 0.002 0.009
Nicaragua 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.45 0.07 0 0.04 0.003 0.01
Paraguay 0.39 0.28 0.31 0.46 0.08 0 0.03 0.001 0.01
Peru 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.43 0.08 0 0.02 0.002 0.006
Uruguay 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.42 0.08 0 0.02 0.002 0.01
Venezuela 0.30 0.25 0.33 0.40 0.09 0 0.01 0.002 0.004
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Table 7  Share of individuals able to work under the lockdown with perfect compliance, by 1-digit ISCO 
and by country
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean, authors’ own calculations
Notes: ISCO 1 refers to “Managers”, ISCO 2 refers to “Professionals”, ISCO 3 refers to “Technicians 
and associate professionals”, ISCO 4 refers to “Clerical support workers”, ISCO 5 refers to “Service and 
sales workers”, ISCO 6 refers to “Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers”, ISCO 7 refers to 
“Craft and related trades workers”, ISCO 8 refers to “Plant and machine operators, and assemblers” and 
ISCO 9 refers to “Elementary occupations”. The shares for the entire LAC region have been calculated as 
a weighted average of the population in each country, excluding Argentina and the Bahamas, which are 
not representative at the national level, and Nicaragua to be consistent with the scenario under imperfect 
compliance. When the information was not available, we leave the cells as empty
a Sample restricted to urban areas
Countries ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4 ISCO 5 ISCO 6 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9
All 0.56 0.82 0.63 0.72 0.43 0.97 0.23 0.42 0.42
Argentina a 0.35 0.82 0.59 0.63 0.24 0.82 0.11 0.18 0.19
Bahamas a 0.86 0.67 0.48 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.60 0.67
Barbados 0.57 0.71 0.63 0.75 0.46 0.59 0.16 0.65 0.35
Belize 0.75 0.84 0.64 0.62 0.50 0.95 0.73 0.82 0.57
Bolivia 0.55 0.90 0.63 0.70 0.68 0.83 0.52 0.15 0.41
Brazil 0.46 0.83 0.66 0.71 0.29 0.99 0.22 0.52 0.57
Chile 0.67 0.84 0.72 0.72 0.65 0.87 0.21 0.32 0.50
Colombia 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.79 0.51 0.97 0.12 0.54 0.58
Costa Rica 0.91 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.83 1 0.97 0.98 0.93
Dominican 
Republic
0.56 0.85 0.68 0.50 0.59 0.95 0.15 0.18 0.39
Ecuador 0.66 0.88 0.68 0.73 0.63 0.99 0.18 0.19 0.33
El Salvador 0.58 0.79 0.64 0.63 0.21 0.99 0.30 0.18 0.41
Guatemala 0.80 0.84 0.60 0.66 0.66 0.96 0.24 0.15 0.40
Jamaica 0.73 0.81 0.69 0.75 0.66 0.95 0.18 0.88 0.48
Mexico 0.61 0.76 0.59 0.74 0.60 0.95 0.26 0.46 0.35
Nicaragua 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Paraguay 0.69 0.86 0.63 0.69 0.72 0.95 0.15 0.65 0.31
Peru 0.73 0.86 0.44 0.65 0.15 1 0.17 0.10 0.34
Uruguay 0.89 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.88 1 0.98 0.98 0.94
Venezuela 0.63 0.82 0.58 0.76 0.73 0.96 0.13 0.15 0.43
1 3
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Table 10  Percentage point variation in the share of individuals able to work under the lockdown due to 
imperfect compliance, by 1-digit ISCO and by country
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean and Oxford Stringency 
Index and Google Workplace Mobility Data, authors’ own calculations
Notes: ISCO 1 refers to “Managers”, ISCO 2 refers to “Professionals”, ISCO 3 refers to “Technicians 
and associate professionals”, ISCO 4 refers to “Clerical support workers”, ISCO 5 refers to “Service and 
sales workers”, ISCO 6 refers to “Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers”, ISCO 7 refers to 
“Craft and related trades workers”, ISCO 8 refers to “Plant and machine operators, and assemblers” and 
ISCO 9 refers to “Elementary occupations”. The shares for the entire LAC region have been calculated as 
a weighted average of the population in each country, excluding Argentina and the Bahamas, which are 
not representative at the national level, and Nicaragua to be consistent with the scenario under imperfect 
compliance. The Bahamas and Nicaragua are the two countries for which we are not able to conduct this 
exercise. For the Bahamas, we cannot calculate non-compliance; and for Nicaragua, there was no lock-
down. For the other countries, when the information was not available, we leave the cells as empty
a Sample restricted to urban areas
Countries ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4 ISCO 5 ISCO 6 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9
All 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.22 0.009 0.28 0.21 0.21
Argentina a 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.22 0.22
Bahamas a
Barbados 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06
Belize 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.09
Bolivia 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.13
Brazil 0.23 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.31 0.002 0.34 0.20 0.19
Chile 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.22 0.19 0.14
Colombia 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.008 0.21 0.11 0.10
Costa Rica 0.02 0.007 0.02 0.02 0.05 0 0.008 0.005 0.02
Dominican 
Republic
0.08 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.18 0.17 0.13
Ecuador 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.004 0.28 0.27 0.23
El Salvador 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.18 0.003 0.16 0.19 0.14
Guatemala 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.02 0.34 0.38 0.27
Jamaica 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.29 0.04 0.19
Mexico 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.02 0.29 0.22 0.26
Nicaragua
Paraguay 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.31 0.13 0.25
Peru 0.10 0.05 0.18 0.11 0.28 0 0.27 0.29 0.21
Uruguay 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.02
Venezuela 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.36 0.35 0.24
1 3
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Table 13  Social assistance programmes during COVID-19 pandemic, by country
Country Programmes
Argentina (1) Ingreso familiar de emergencia – transfer for households with a household 
head between 18 and 65 who works in domestic service, is an informal worker, 
is a monostributista social (categories A and B), or households receiving AUH 
or Progresar social programmes; household must not have a formal source of 
labour income or receive any pensions
Bahamas (1) B$25 million for health care
(2) B$5 million for food programmes
(3) B$145 million for income support for job loss workers and self-employed
(4) B$1.8 million to support to Family Islands (specifically to be used for any 
COVID-19–related expenditure)
Barbados (1) Unemployment assistance for COVID-19
(2) Unemployment Programme for Self-Employed
Belize (1) Providing short-term relief to employees affected by the crisis, especially those 
in the tourism sector
(2) Additional support to the healthcare sector and the unemployed has been 
financed with loans from bilateral and multilateral creditors
Bolivia (1) Direct relief payments to poorer households of about $US73 per child to 
households with children in public schools and students in private schools
(2) Programme (Canasta Familiar) to make direct payments for food to 1.5 million 
families ($US58 per family)
(3) Payments to electric bills for 3 months for the consumers with lower consump-
tion and pay 50% of the potable water and gas for all households
(4) The latest transfer to households (Bono Contra el Hambre) became available 
starting on December 2020. It provides a one-off transfer of about $146 for all 
eligible individuals
Brazil (1) Transfer for households with individuals whose main source of income comes 
from being informal workers or self-employed; unemployed; or microentrepre-
neurs; these households must not be beneficiaries of Bolsa Familia; their total 
income must not be more than R$3135 or total per capita income above R$522.5
Chile (1) Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia — transfer for households whose source of 
income is mainly from informal sources. The amount depends on the number of 
people in the household and decreases according to the percentage of income 
that is formal; pensioners from Pension Solidaria de la Vejez receive a smaller 
amount of aid
(2) Bono de Emergencia COVID 19 — this transfer aims at households with 
individuals receiving Subsidio Familiar (SUF), households in the Sistema de 
Seguridades y Oportunidades database, households who belong to the 60% most 
vulnerable according to the Registro Social de Hogares database and households 
who do not have a formal income through employment or pension and do not 
have any SUF beneficiaries
Colombia (1) Payments to health providers for ICU availability
(2) Creation of a National Tracking and Contact Center
(3) A one-off bonus for health workers
(4) Delayed utility payments for poor and middle-income households
(5) Transfers for vulnerable groups, and additional benefits for recently unem-
ployed workers
Costa Rica (1) A monthly subsidy of ¢125,000 (US$205) for 3 months to about 375 thousand 
households economically affected by the crisis with a monthly income of less 
than ¢750,000 (US$1230) prior to COVID-19
(2) An increase in public health spending, including construction of a specialized 
hospital for COVID-19 treatment and purchase of COVID-19 vaccines
1 3
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Table 13  (continued)
Country Programmes
Dominican Republic (1) The Quédate en Casa programme, subsidizing the most vulnerable house-
holds, including informal workers
(2) Coverage under the existing programme Comer es Primero, paying RD$5000 
(roughly US$90) per month
(3) 452,817 families receive additional transfers of RD$2000 (about US$36) per 
month
(4) Employee Solidarity Assistance Fund, benefits about 754,000 families of for-
mal workers who were laid off with a monthly transfer up to 70% of last formal 
wages (minimum of RD$5000, RD$8104 on average)
(5) A programme Pati was introduced to support independent workers, providing 
RD$5000 (about US$90) a month to each beneficiary with an additional allow-
ance made available for healthcare workers, the military and police officers, 
amounting to RD$2.4 billion
Ecuador (1) Transfer for affiliates to the unpaid work regime or self-employed; or affiliates 
to the Seguro Social Campesino, with income lower than US$400 and who 
are not registered to the contributive social security and are not registered as 
dependents; individuals must not be beneficiaries of any other programmes of 
the government
(2) Transfer for people not included in the previous subgroup whose income is 
lower than $400 and are below the poverty line
El Salvador (1) Transfer for informal employees and self-employed workers with low social 
economic resources
Guatemala (1) Electricity subsidies
(2) Fostering low-income housing
Jamaica (1) Temporary cash transfer to individuals for whom loss of employment can be 
verified since March 10
(2) Grants targeted at the most vulnerable segments of society
Mexico (1) The government is providing subsidized unemployment insurance for 
3 months to workers that hold a mortgage with the Housing Institute (5.9 billion 
pesos)
(2) Additional resources are allocated to social spending related to infrastructure, 
security, education, urban improvement and other areas (62 billion pesos)
Nicaragua (1) Provision of food packages among vulnerable families
Paraguay (1) Supporting vulnerable population
Peru (1) Bono Independiente — transfer for households with main income source com-
ing from self-employment and not in poverty; households cannot be beneficiar-
ies of the Juntos, Pension 65, or Contigo programmes; none of the household 
members can be registered as dependent workers of the public or private sector; 
household members cannot have income over PEN$1200 and cannot be part of 
any local or central government
Uruguay (1) Transfer for food purchases for informal and self-employed workers, with no 
other social programme benefits and who do not have social security
Venezuela NA
Source: Taken from Busso et al. (2020) and complemented with IMF-COVID tracker and other sources
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Table 14  Mean loss labour income rate with perfect compliance, by 1-digit ISCO and by country
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean, authors’ own calculations
Notes: ISCO 1 refers to “Managers”, ISCO 2 refers to “Professionals”, ISCO 3 refers to “Technicians 
and associate professionals”, ISCO 4 refers to “Clerical support workers”, ISCO 5 refers to “Service and 
sales workers”, ISCO 6 refers to “Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers”, ISCO 7 refers to 
“Craft and related trades workers”, ISCO 8 refers to “Plant and machine operators, and assemblers” and 
ISCO 9 refers to “Elementary occupations”. The rates for the entire LAC region have been calculated as 
a weighted average of the population in each country, excluding Argentina and the Bahamas, which are 
not representative at the national level, and Nicaragua to be consistent with the scenario under imperfect 
compliance. When the information was not available, we leave the cells as empty
a Sample restricted to urban areas
Countries ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4 ISCO 5 ISCO 6 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9
All 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.005 0.15 0.12 0.12
Argentina a 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.02 0.19 0.19 0.20
Bahamas a 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.08
Barbados 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
Belize 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.006 0.03 0.02 0.06
Bolivia 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.11
Brazil 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.14 0 0.15 0.09 0.09
Chile 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.14 0.11
Colombia 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.006 0.16 0.08 0.08
Costa Rica 0.01 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.02 0 0.004 0.002 0.009
Dominican 
Republic
0.08 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.009 0.15 0.15 0.11
Ecuador 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.002 0.11 0.10 0.09
El Salvador 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.002 0.17 0.20 0.14
Guatemala 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.28 0.31 0.22
Jamaica 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.01 0.009 0.001 0.01 0.003 0.02
Mexico 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.009 0.14 0.10 0.12
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paraguay 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.006 0.10 0.04 0.08
Peru 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.23 0 0.22 0.24 0.18
Uruguay 0.01 0.006 0.01 0.009 0.02 0 0.002 0.003 0.008
Venezuela 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.008 0.19 0.18 0.13
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Table 17  Percentage point variation in the mean loss labour income rate due to imperfect compliance, by 
1-digit ISCO and by country
Source: Harmonised Household Surveys of Latin America and the Caribbean and Oxford Stringency 
Index and Google Workplace Mobility Data, authors’ own calculations
Notes: ISCO 1 refers to “Managers”, ISCO 2 refers to “Professionals”, ISCO 3 refers to “Technicians 
and associate professionals”, ISCO 4 refers to “Clerical support workers”, ISCO 5 refers to “Service and 
sales workers”, ISCO 6 refers to “Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers”, ISCO 7 refers to 
“Craft and related trades workers”, ISCO 8 refers to “Plant and machine operators, and assemblers” and 
ISCO 9 refers to “Elementary occupations”. The rates for the entire LAC region have been calculated as 
a weighted average of the population in each country, excluding Argentina and the Bahamas, which are 
not representative at the national level, and Nicaragua to be consistent with the scenario under imperfect 
compliance. When the information was not available, we leave the cells as empty
a Sample restricted to urban areas
Countries ISCO 1 ISCO 2 ISCO 3 ISCO 4 ISCO 5 ISCO 6 ISCO 7 ISCO 8 ISCO 9
All  − 0.03  − 0.01  − 0.03  − 0.02  − 0.05  − 0.002  − 0.06  − 0.04  − 0.04
Argentina a  − 0.03  − 0.01  − 0.03  − 0.02  − 0.05  − 0.007  − 0.05  − 0.05  − 0.05
Bahamas a
Barbados  − 0.002  − 0.001  − 0.002  − 0.001  − 0.003  − 0.002  − 0.004  − 0.002  − 0.003
Belize  − 0.006  − 0.004  − 0.009  − 0.01  − 0.01  − 0.001  − 0.007  − 0.005  − 0.01
Bolivia  − 0.02  − 0.004  − 0.01  − 0.01  − 0.01  − 0.007  − 0.02  − 0.03  − 0.02
Brazil  − 0.05  − 0.01  − 0.03  − 0.02  − 0.06 0  − 0.07  − 0.04  − 0.04
Chile  − 0.02  − 0.01  − 0.02  − 0.02  − 0.02  − 0.006  − 0.04  − 0.04  − 0.03
Colombia  − 0.01  − 0.01  − 0.01  − 0.009  − 0.02  − 0.001  − 0.04  − 0.02  − 0.02
Costa Rica  − 0.003 0  − 0.002  − 0.002  − 0.006 0  − 0.001 0  − 0.003
Dominican 
Republic
 − 0.01  − 0.005  − 0.01  − 0.02  − 0.02  − 0.002  − 0.03  − 0.03  − 0.02
Ecuador  − 0.01  − 0.005  − 0.01  − 0.01  − 0.02 0  − 0.04  − 0.04  − 0.03
El Salvador  − 0.02  − 0.01  − 0.02  − 0.02  − 0.04 0  − 0.04  − 0.05  − 0.03
Guatemala  − 0.03  − 0.03  − 0.07  − 0.06  − 0.06  − 0.006  − 0.12  − 0.14  − 0.10
Jamaica 0  − 0.001  − 0.002  − 0.003  − 0.003 0  − 0.004  − 0.001  − 0.006
Mexico  − 0.03  − 0.02  − 0.03  − 0.02  − 0.03  − 0.004  − 0.05  − 0.04  − 0.05
Nicaragua
Paraguay  − 0.01  − 0.006  − 0.02  − 0.01  − 0.01  − 0.002  − 0.04  − 0.02  − 0.03
Peru  − 0.03  − 0.01  − 0.05  − 0.03  − 0.07 0  − 0.07  − 0.08  − 0.06
Uruguay  − 0.005  − 0.002  − 0.004  − 0.003  − 0.005 0 0  − 0.001  − 0.003
Venezuela  − 0.03  − 0.02  − 0.04  − 0.02  − 0.02  − 0.003  − 0.08  − 0.07  − 0.05
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